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Sharing the Costs of Artificial
Intelligence: Universal No-Fault
Social Insurance for Personal Injuries
ABSTRACT

The twenty-first century is the artificialintelligence (Al) century.
In the past few years, Al has become a familiarfixture of everyday life
thanks to services like YouTube, Spotify, Netflix, and Alexa. Stock
traders, doctors, insurancebrokers, real estate agents, recruiters, artists,
and even lawyers now rely on predictive tools powered by Al to perform
their highly skilled-even creative-tasks. In the following decades, AI
will continue to transform more fields and deliver astonishing
advancements in convenience, comfort, safety, and security. At the same
time, however, Al will bring about new challenges. Al will offend,
disrupt, crash, breach, incite, injure, and even kill in unexpected ways.
Unlike traditional injuries, tort law will have difficulty finding the
injuries caused by highly sophisticatedAI to be the fault of someone's
negligence or some product's defect. Regulating Al ex ante will be
increasingly difficult due to Al's growing complexity. As such, under
current law, blameless victims of Al injuries are likely to bear all the
burden of Al's negative externalities. Thus, to ensure the fair and
sustainabledevelopment of Al, this Note proposes adopting a universal
social insurance scheme modeled after New Zealand's accident
compensation scheme that complements appropriatesafety regulations.
Specifically, this Note proposes a social insurancescheme that covers all
personal injuries by accident, abolishes tort claims, and finances itself
from general tax revenues. These features will ensure Al injuries are a
collective responsibility, so Al can continue to grow and promote social
progress with the public's full confidence.
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In Guido Calabresi's Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law,
Calabresi presents a hypothetical scenario in which an imaginary
community is offered a magical gift from an "evil deity" that will benefit
the community at the expense of one thousand sacrificial lives.'
Whether to accept the gift, however, is not the interesting issue,
because real-world communities almost always accept the real-world
gift. 2 The gift, of course, is a metaphor for technological innovations,
like automobiles or the factory production process, which raise the
3
standard of living while creating new sources of personal injuries. The
interesting issue is instead how to equitably allocate the cost of the gift.4
Should the unlucky victims who incur technological injuries
Or should other members of the
independently bear the burden?
if
so, how?
and,
burden
the
share
community
In the twentieth century, the US personal injury legal regime
5
assigned the costs of technological injuries to those "at fault." The basic
principle of fault-based tort law was that a defendant who acted

GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES,
1.
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 1 (1985).

2.

See id. at 2.

3.

See id. at 1, 5.

4.

See id. at 17.

AND THE LAw:

PRIVATE LAW

See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS
5.
(2d ed. 2016).

§

9.1
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unreasonably, and thereby caused an injury, was liable for the
damages. 6 Courts gradually extended rules 7 and admitted new
doctrines6 to more extensively shift costs from victims to injurers in
situations where they found the traditional fault-based system did not
compensate victims adequately.
In select fields, legislatures also
augmented or replaced tort law with regulatory regimes, such as the
motor vehicle safety regime, 9 and with social insurance schemes, such
as workers' compensation, to shift costs and prevent injuries.
While the allocation schemes of the twentieth century sufficed
for the evil deity of technological innovations, can they respond
adequately to twenty-first century challenges borne by the Artificial
Intelligence (AI) "deity," the contemporary bearer of magical gifts? This
Note argues that they cannot and proposes that-to properly allocate
the cost of Al injuries-the United States should consider replacing the
current tort regime with a universal no-fault social insurance scheme,
in addition to appropriate Al regulations. Part I explains the benefits
of Al, how it works, and what unique legal problems it presents. Part
II analyzes the weaknesses of tort law and regulatory law, both
generally and as applied to Al. Part III discusses no-fault social
insurance for personal injuries, summarizing how New Zealand
implemented a successful scheme and how a similar scheme may
address Al injuries in the United States. Part IV concludes with a
discussion on the implications of failing to develop Al in a fair manner
in the United States.
I. THE IMPENDING Al REVOLUTION AND ITS SOCIAL COSTS
Al will transform the way people live in the twenty-first century.
Al will raise the standard of living and has the potential to ameliorate
the social inequities that result from human biases and errors.1 0
6.
See id. §§ 9.5-6.
7.
See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (eliminating
the privity requirement for claims of negligent product design).
8.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
(establishing strict products liability).
9.
See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
10.
See Eric Rice & Milind Tambe, Forget Killer Robots, AI as a Tool for Social Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:11 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/forget-killerrobots-ai-as-a-tool-for-social-justice-us 5a2956a3e4bO53b5525db7dd
[https://perma.cc/MZB4AVA3]; see, e.g., Angela Chen, How Artificial Intelligence Can Help Us Make Judges Less Biased,
VERGE (Jan. 17, 2019 12:07 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/17/18186674/daniel-chenmachine-learning-rule-of-law-economics -psychology-j udicial- system-policy [https://perma.cc/
ACE8-RMZF] (describing how machine learning algorithms can raise awareness of unconscious
biases in judges). But see, e.g., CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 13 (2016)

(describing how algorithms have reinforced and amplified existing inequities in many areas of life,
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However, the proliferation of Al will also lead to injuries that are not
any human's fault.
A. The AI Revolution
Al will revolutionize society in the near future. For example,
Elon Musk predicts that self-driving vehicles, one prominent
application of Al, will replace conventional, human-operated vehicles
by the year 2035.11 Self-driving vehicles will facilitate car-sharing and
driverless taxi services, optimize vehicle utilization, reduce the cost of
They will serve
transportation, and democratize mobility. 12
underserved populations, like the disabled, the elderly, and minors,
who are unable to drive themselves. 13 When there is no demand for
them, self-driving vehicles will park themselves away from city centers,
returning valuable inner city parking space back to city planners for
Self-driving
more productive uses like parks or developments.14
vehicles, being efficient drivers, will consume fuel more economicallyThey will potentially
thus contributing less carbon emissions.1 5
grids" to coordinate
"smart
with
and
other
each
with
communicate
routes, prevent traffic on a system-wide level, and reduce emergency
vehicle response times. 16 They will free drivers from the dynamic

including access to credit, school admissions, and job prospects); Karen Hao, AIIs Sending People
2019),
(Jan.
21,
TECH.
REV.
It
Wrong,
MIT
Getting
to
Jail-and
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ail [https://perma.cc/
MMS6-MAL2].
See Cadie Thompson, Elon Musk: In Less Than 20 Years, Owning a Car Will Be Like
11.
Owning a Horse, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:16 AM), https://www.businessinsider.comelon[https://perma.cc/TB4D-RX68].
musk-owning-a-car-in-20-years-like-owning-a-horse-2015-11
Similar estimates have been made by a variety of authorities. For example, the United Arab
Emirates aims to convert 25 percent of total transportation in Dubai to self-driving vehicles by
2030. See Mohammed bin Rashid Approves Dubai Autonomous TransportationStrategy, DUBAI
FUTURE FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.dubaifuture.gov.ae/mohammed-bin-rashid-approvesdubai-autonomous-transportation-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/4QWJ-NTSQ]. But see Tim Higgins,
Driverless Cars Tap the Brakes After Years of Hype, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-cars-tap-the-brakes-after-years-of-hype-11547737205
[https://perma.ccWZJ8-E3FK].
See Saeed Asadi Bagloee et al., Autonomous Vehicles: Challenges, Opportunities, and
12.
Future Implications for TransportationPolicies, 24 J. MODERN TRANSP. 284, 289, 295 (2016);
Michele Kyrouz, Mobility for Everyone: The Social and Economic Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles,
https://medium.com/smart-cars-a-podcast-about-autonomous2017),
28,
(Nov.
MEDIUM
2
[https:/perma.cc[UAR2vehicles/balancing-mobility-equity-and-traffic-concerns-bbb8d68 c lc5
2RTA].
See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR
13.
POLICYMAKERS 16 (2016).

See id. at 27.
14.
See id. at 28; Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents
15.
Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 247, 251 (2013).
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 23-24.
16.
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driving task and allow them to use their travel time more
productively.1 7 Most importantly, self-driving vehicles are never drunk,
distracted, or willing to take irrational or emotional risks. Accordingly,
they will prevent needless accidents and save lives.18 All of these social
benefits stem from a single Al product. 19 Experts predict similar
extraordinary advances in living standards and equity within two to
three decades in healthcare, 20 the food and agriculture industry, 21
education, 22 environmental conservation, 23 space exploration, 24 and
more.25
Although two decades sounds like fantasy, it is not an unrealistic
timeframe given the law of accelerating returns. 26
The law of
accelerating returns is the observation and prediction that the
development of technology has and will progress at an exponential
rate. 27 Consider, for example, that early human technology, like fire

17.
See id. at 25-26.
18.
See id. at 15-16. A survey of accidents involving early stage self-driving vehicles
testing in California revealed that out of sixty-two accidents that occurred while the vehicles were
in autonomous mode, only one was due to Al error. See Kia Kokalitcheva, People Cause Most

CaliforniaAutonomous Vehicle Accidents, AXIos (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.axios.com/californiapeople-cause-most-autonomous-vehicle-accidents-dc962265-c9bb-4b00-ae97- 50427f6bc936.html
[https://perma.cclK93A-AVXQ].
19.

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 40.

20.
See Nic Fleming, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing Drug Discovery, NATURE
(May 30, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05267-x [https://perma.cc/38VX2DQD]; Christianna Reedy, Kurzweil: By 2030, Nanobots Will Flow Throughout Our Bodies,
FUTURISM (Apr. 24, 2017), https://futurism.com/kurzweil-by-2030-nanobots-will-flow-throughout-

our-bodies [https://perma.cc/4G8R-X8GF].
21.
See Krista Garver, 6 Examples of Artificial Intelligence in the Food Industry, FOOD
INDUSTRY EXECUTIVE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://foodindustryexecutive.com/2018/04/6-examples-of-

artificial-intelligence-in-the-food-industry/ [https://perma.cc/KM7B-WDUY]; Kumba Sennaar, Al
in
Agriculture-Present Applications
and
Impact,
EMERJ
(Jan.
31,
2019),
https://www.techemergence.com/ai-agriculture-present-applications-impact/ [https://perma.cc/
QSA9-ZKSS].
22.
See Tom Vanderbilt, How Artificial Intelligence Can Change Higher Education,
SMITHSONIAN.COM

(Dec.

2012),

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/how-artificial-

intelligence-can-change-higher-education- 136983766/ [https://perma.cclH84M-47PH].
23.
See Renee Cho, Artificial Intelligence-A Game Changer for Climate Change and the
Environment,

COLUM.

U.

EARTH

INST.

(June

5,

2018),

https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/06/05/artificial-intelligence-climate-environment/
[https://perma.cc/X783-NUVP].
24.
See Abby Norman, NASA Al Will Lead the Future of Space Exploration, FUTURISM
(June
27,
2017),
https://futurism.com/nasa-ai-will-lead-the-future-of-space-exploration
[https://perma.ccCWU8-USHP].
25.

JAMES MANYIKA, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., WHATS Now AND NEXT IN ANALYTICS, Al,

AND AUTOMATION 1 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/
digital%2 0disruption/whats%20now%20and%20next%20in%20analytics%20automation/final%20
pdf/mgi-briefing-note-automation-final.ashx [https://perma.cc/4K3Q-2ZY4].

26.
See RAY KURZWEL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR 35 (2005); MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY, at xviii (2015).
27.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 26, at 35.
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and stone tools, took tens of thousands of years to spread after their
discovery; the printing press, invented five hundred years ago, took
about a century; and, recently, worldwide adoption of revolutionary
technologies, like cellular phones and the internet, only took a few
years. 28 Exponential growth occurs because each new invention or
discovery makes it easier to develop the next thing. 29 The use of earlystage AI in certain fields has itself already accelerated the speed at
which humans innovate. 30 Soon, AI will replace humans in scientific
discovery 31 and even the arts, 32 leading to even faster development of
smarter Al and an explosion in social welfare. The law must prepare
now to respond to the AI revolution, or it will become dangerously
obsolete. 3 3

B. What Is AI?
Al, like many things, is a spectrum. 34 On the simplest end is the
smart vacuum, the Roomba. A Roomba is intelligent in that it makes

&

See id. at 42. The cost performance of computational power is famously growing at an
28.
exponential rate as well. See id. at 71.
29.
See id. at 40.
See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and
30.
Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 35 (2015); Patrick Riley & Dale Webster, LargeScale Machine Learning for Drug Discovery, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/03/1arge-scale-machine-learning-for-drug.html [https://perma.cc/
38XE-LK6K].
See generally Hiroaki Kitano, Artificial Intelligence to Win the Nobel Prize and Beyond:
31.
Creating the Engine for Scientific Discovery, 37 Al MAG. 39, 39 (2016) (challenging the Al
community to develop an AI system that will win the Nobel prize and predicting that it will).
32.
See, e.g., Gabe Cohn, Up for Bid, AIArt Signed 'Algorithm,'N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/arts/design/christies-art-artificial-intelligence-obvious.html
[https://perma.cc/CK2D-8DE9] (visual arts); Tirhakah Love, Do Androids Dream of ElectricBeats?
How Al Is Changing Music for Good, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 22, 2018,
9:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.comlmusic/2018/oct/22/ai-artificial-intelligence-composing
[https://perma.cc/8X36-QUHZ] (music); David Streitfeld, Computer Stories: A.I. Is Beginning to
Assist Novelists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/technology/ai-isbeginning-to-assist-novelists.html [https://perma.ccPU8Z-QSZB] (literary arts).
See Kelsey R. Marquart, If We Don't Regulate Automation, It Could Decimate the U.S.
33.
Economy, FUTURISM (Apr. 14, 2017), https://futurism.comlif-we-dont-regulate-automation-itcould-decimate-the-u-s-economy [https://perma.cc/44DZ-PSDW].
See Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative
34.
Solutions to Regulate ArtificialIntelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 396 (2017). Defining
AI is one of the most fundamental challenges of AI law. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating
Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L.
TECH. 353, 859 (2016). Perhaps this difficulty is only natural since delineating the contours of
"person" has been similarly intractable. See SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL
THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 183 (2011) (discussing the jurisprudence of

personhood for slaves and corporations); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1284-85 (1992) (discussing the debates over legal personhood
in fringe cases like higher mammals, individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder, comatose
persons, fetuses, and trees).
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independent decisions-to turn, to stop, and to return to its basewithout direct human control. 35 A Roomba is able to do this thanks to
sensors, which detect when the Roomba has hit a wall or reached a cliff,
and a basic set of rules, written by the Roomba's programmer, which
dictate the Roomba's response to each kind of stimulus. 36 A Roomba,
however, is not able to change the rules that govern its actions.
An image recognition software that identifies faces is an
example of a slightly more sophisticated, learning A.3 7 An image
recognition software is not pre-programmed with a set of rules to
follow. 3 8 It instead has a machine learning algorithm, which takes a
large set of training images labeled by human trainers and generates
its own rules for predicting the correct label of a new image. 39 After
training, the software can recognize faces in a never-before-seen
image. 40 If a human labels the new image for the algorithm, the
software can update its rules to reflect the additional information. 41
Learning Al thus have two important traits: (1) their rules are not
hardcoded by a human and (2) their rules continue to change even after
they have left the programmer's control. 42 Because they do not simply

35.
See Julia Layton, How Robotic Vacuums Work, HoWSTUFFWORKS (Nov. 3, 2005),
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/home/robotic-vacuum2.htm
[https://perma.cc/SX5D-JAGA].
36.
See id.
37.
See Warren E. Agin, A Simple Guide to Machine Learning, 14 SCITECH LAW. 4, 7
(2017).
38.
See id. For example, there is no rule programmed into the machine that tells the
machine that a person with long hair may be a girl. See id.
39.
See id.; Chris Meserole, What Is Machine Learning?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edulresearch/what-is-machine-learning/
[https://perma.cc/99L4-EPBU].
The machine learning algorithm itself is hard-coded by a programmer. See generally CHRISTOPHER
M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING 2 (Michael Jordan et al. eds., 2006).

There are many machine learning algorithms that the programmer may choose, ranging from
statistical algorithms to artificial neural networks. See id. at 3; Joe Davison, No, Machine Learning
Is
Not
Just
Glorified
Statistics,
TOWARDS
DATA
SC.
(June
27,
2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/no-machine-learning-is-not-just-glorified-statistics-26d3952234e3
[https://perma.cc/5PVP-YLY3]. Each kind of algorithm does require a programmer to make design
choices, which affect how a machine learns. See generally BISHOP, supra, at 33-34. For example,
if the algorithm is learning a neural network, then the programmer typically chooses the number
of"layers" and "neurons" on the basis of some engineering principles and experience. See id. at vii,
32, 229. However, the fundamental characteristic of learning Al, that they learn rules
independently, is true in all of these algorithms. See id. at 1. Furthermore, new techniques are
quickly being developed to take even the engineering task away from humans. See Janakiram
MSV, Why AutoML Is Set to Become the Future ofArtificial Intelligence, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2018/04/15/why-automil-is-set-to-become-the-future-

of-artificial-intelligence/#52622726780a [https://perma.cc/R235-VBEA].
40.
See Agin, supranote 37, at 7.
41.
See id.
42.
See id.
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do what they were programmed to do, this kind of Al will challenge
existing legal doctrines. 43
C. The Social Cost of AI
While Al will provide exciting benefits, it will do so at the cost of
highly unpredictable injuries. Al causes unpredictable injuries because
of its ability to exhibit surprising behavior, also known as emergent
behavior, which is itself a product of Al's aforementioned ability to learn
rules from training data autonomously. 44 Usually, making a startling
discovery-or, as marketers call it, an insight-is one of the key
features of using Al. 4 5 But emergent behavior can also have appalling
consequences, like when Google Photos labeled two black people as
gorillaS 46 or when Microsoft's chatbot turned into a sex-crazed neoNazi.4 7 Facebook's algorithms, which have the purported purpose of
helping people share valuable content and bring the world closer
together, have instead spread fake news, trapped people in echo
chambers, and incited hate and violence. 48 Since these Al are not

43.
See Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied
Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51, 52 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
44.
See id. at 57.
45.
See Ryan Calo, Is the Law Ready for Driverless Cars?, 61 COMM. ACM 34, 36 (2018);
see, e.g., Jody Kochansky, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence and What It Means to BlackRock,
BLACKROCK: BLOG, https://www.blackrockblog.com/2018/03/08/artificial-intelligence-blackrock/
[https://perma.cc6YJ5-63LJ].
46.
See Alistair Barr, Google Mistakenly Tags Black People As 'Gorillas,'Showing Limits
3:40
PM),
J.:
DIGITS
BLOG
(July
1,
2015,
of
Algorithms,
WALL
ST.
https:/fblogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/01/google- mistakenly-tags-black-people-as-gorillas-showinglimits-of-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/EZA9-99PH]; Tom Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas,
Google
Photos
Remains
Blind,
WIRED
(Jan.
11,
2018,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/
[ttps://perma.cc/9FWD-RSYYJ.
Rachel Metz, Why Microsoft Accidentally Unleashed a Neo-Nazi Sexbot, MIT TECH.
47.
REV. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601111/why-microsoft-accidentallyunleashed-a-neo-nazi-sexbot/ [https://perma.cc/2S3X-G8M2].
48.

See JANNA ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE OF TRUTH AND

46
(2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpONLINE
8,
17,
MISINFORMATION
content/uploads/sites/14/2017/10/19095643/PI_2017.10.19_Future-of-Truth-andMisinformationFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNQ7-R78T]; Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 4, 6 n.14, 93, n.673 (2018); Carole Cadwalladr, 'I Made Steve Bannon's
Psychological Warfare Tool': Meet the Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018, 5:44
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wyliefaceook-nix-bannon-trump [https://perma.cc/TC8Y-5NJ9]; Carole Cadwalladr & Emma GrahamHarrison, How Cambridge Analytica Turned Facebook 'Likes' into a Lucrative Political Tool,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
17,
2018,
9:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge-analytica-kogan-dataalgorithm [https://perma.cc/E4YG-WAJZ]; Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are
Tinderboxes
and
Facebook
Is
a
Match,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/asia/facebook-sri-lanka-riots.html
[https://perma.cc/77T8-MWJRJ.

2019]

UNIVERSAL NO-FAULT SOCIAL INSURANCE

1163

executing specific instructions given to them by any human, it is not
obvious who, if anybody, is responsible for such injuries, at least the
first time the injury occurs. 49
Unexpected interactions between sophisticated Al systems can
amplify the effects of emergent behavior. For example, high-frequency
trading algorithms acting independently of each other caused shocking
market crashes in 2010 and 2015.50 In fact, mini flash crashes are now
an everyday occurrence for many stocks.5 1 So far, computer scientists
have not been able to develop a method to predict harmful emergent
behavior ex ante; they have only been able to apply patches to problems
ex post. 52 With respect to high-frequency trading, the stock exchanges
have installed breakers to shut down trading in the event of an
emergency and speed bumps to slow down trading; however, no
technical solutions exist to prevent crashes, no financial regulations
impose liability on algorithmic traders, and society is unwilling to give
up the technology. 53 With advancements in mechanical engineering
and robotics technology, Al machines-such as self-driving vehicles,
surgery robots, and personal care robots-will begin to cause physical
injuries that will similarly challenge programmers and policy makers. 54

49.
See Agin, supra note 37, at 7. With respect to social media platforms, their executives
have been subjected to congressional inquiries and some members of congress have voiced support
for some kind of regulation, but no bills have been proposed to address responsibility for Al injuries
yet. See Katy Steinmetz, Lawmakers Hint at Regulating Social Media During Hearing with
Facebook and Twitter Execs, TIME (Sept. 5, 2018), http://time.com/5387560/senate-intelligencehearing-facebook-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/G9A4-EKP9].
50.
Ted Kaufman, Preventing the Next Flash Crash: Why We're Still at Risk, FORTUNE
(May
5,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/05/flash-crash-high-frequency-trading-risk/
[https://perma.c/T5T4-XJDQ].
51.
Alexander Munk & Erhan Bayraktar, Opinion: The Stock Market Has About 12 Mini
Flash Crashes a Day-and We Can't Prevent Them, MKT. WATCH (July 31, 2017, 12:47 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-stock-market-has-about- 12-mini-flash-crashes-a-dayand-we-cant-prevent-them-2017-07-31 [https://perma.cc/KY3E-BQML].
52.
See, e.g., Kaufman, supranote 50 (noting that stock exchanges now automatically shut
down upon flash crashes); Metz, supra note 47 (noting that Microsoft's chatbot was shut down);
Simonite, supra note 46 (noting that Google Photos, unable to fix the problem of labeling black
people as gorillas, simply eliminated gorillas from the universe of potential matches). One bruteforce attempt to address emergent behavior is to test run the machine in a fake environment,

though anticipating AI behavior through simulations has mathematical limitations. See Calo,
supra note 45, at 36.
53.
See Kaufman, supra note 50; Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Algorithms Take Control of
Wall Street, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/12/ff-ai-flashtrading/
[https://perma.cc/A5Y4-7EBA]; Megan Woodward, Bumping Up the Competition: The Influence of
IEX's Speed Bump in US Financial Markets 13-14, 19 (May 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202843
[https://perma.cc/F8MA-UVD5].
The
SEC's
proposed
regulation, Regulation Automated Trading, came close to regulating high-frequency trading, by
requiring high-frequency traders to register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
See id. at 13-14.
54.
See Calo, supra note 45, at 35; Drew Simshaw et al., Regulating Health Care Robots:
Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing Risks, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-23 (2016). Calo
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As Al grows even more sophisticated, it will even become
difficult to fix or understand AI behavior ex post facto.5 5 In fact,
inexplicable Al behavior already occurs on a small scale: Facebook's AI
research team observed its experimental trade and negotiation Al
develop their own incomprehensible language in order to hammer out
deals with each other more efficiently. 56 Similarly, Google Translate,
in order to translate one language to another, first translates the input
language into its self-developed artificial language and then translates
that to the target language.5 7 Future Al will utilize even more
sophisticated knowledge representation and reasoning powers. For
example, consider an advanced Al vehicle fleet, equipped with the
collective experience of millions of driving hours, and informed by
superhuman sensors and smart grid data.5 8 It is also able to discern
the age, health, wealth, and criminal status of people on the road
around it and apply that data to its culturally specific ethics training. 59
In the event of a fatal collision, this Al will have relied on complex,
multifactor, machine-learned rules that are, in effect, impossible for
humans to review or appreciate. 60 It will be even harder to appreciate,
both legally and technically, this Al's mysterious decisions to reroute,
delay, or make harmful maneuvers in order to preemptively avoid a
worse outcome. 61
describes a hypothetical scenario in which a self-driving vehicle accidentally kills its owner by
running its engine in the garage and suffocating the owner, because it learned that it has better
gas mileage if it charges its battery overnight. See Calo, supra note 45, at 35.
55.
See David C. Viadeck, Machines Without Principals:Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 127 (2014); John Pavlus, A New Approach to Understanding
How Machines Think, QUANTA MAG. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.quantamagazine.orgbeen-kimis-building-a-translator-for-artificial-intelligence-20 190110/ [https://perma.cc/4E5B-KZ2L].
See Andrew Griffin, Facebook's Artificial Intelligence Robots Shut Down After They
56.
Start Talking to Each Other in Their Own Language, INDEPENDENT (July 31, 2017, 5:10 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-artificial-intelligenceai-chatbot-new-language-research-openai-google-a7869706.html [https://perma.cc/Z59S-2ZYE].
57.
See id.
See Kevin Funkhouser, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products
58.
Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 443-44 (2013); Vladeck, supra
note 55, at 125-26.
59.

See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT

FROM WRONG 16 (2008); Ajung Moon et al., The Open Roboethics Initiative and the Elevator-Riding
Robot, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 43, at 131, 131-32; Zak Doffman, Killer Cars and Four Other
Terrifying Predictions for the Future of Al, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2018, 10:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2018/10/3 1/five-ghoulish-big-brother-predictions-for-aigiven-its-halloween/#5857d2de308b [https://perma.cc/4RBT-9VTS]; Caroline Lester, A Study on
Driverless-Car Ethics Offers a Troubling Look into Our Values, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/a-study-on-driverless-car-ethics-offers-a-troublinglook-into-our-values [https://perma.cc/CTG2-UKEQ].
See WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 59, at 86-91; Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley
60.
and the Pinto: Cost-Benefit Analysis in Automated Driving and Other Cyber-Physical Systems, 4
TEX. A&M L. REV. 197, 207 (2017).

61.

See Calo, supra note 45, at 35.
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II. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED US LAW

Broadly, there are two regimes for assigning injury costs: private
tort law and public regulatory law. 6 2 This Part reviews the unique
challenges that Al will pose to both.
A. Private Tort Law
The two tort doctrines most relevant to Al injuries are
negligence and products liability. Both causes of action require faulteither the unreasonable conduct of a defendant or the unreasonable
design of a product. 63 Given that even the most careful Al programmers
are unable to predict or completely prevent highly sophisticated AI
injuries without removing Al's autonomy altogether, tort law will not
find any person or product at fault and will consequently allocate injury
costs to victims.

64

Some

commentators

have

instead proposed

extending various strict liability doctrines so that Al product designers
are categorically responsible for Al injuries. 65 While this is an
attractive solution for victims, this proposal goes too far in shifting the
burden to designers because a strict liability regime would discourage
the production of Al and its tremendous positive externalities. In
addition to these allocative problems, the tort regime also suffers from
various nonallocative flaws.
1. Negligence
In general, a defendant is liable for the cost of a plaintiffs injury
if the plaintiff proves the defendant owed her a duty, breached that
duty, and, as a result, proximately caused her injury. 66 In general, an
individual only has a duty to act as a reasonable person.6 7 A defendant's
negligence is the proximate cause of an injury only if the injury was a
foreseeable consequence of that negligence. 68 There are two kinds of
negligence that are relevant to sophisticated Al injuries: negligent
design and negligent use.

62.
Injury costs can also be allocated by contract law to a certain extent. For a brief
discussion on contracts, see F. Patrick Hubbard, "Sophisticated Robots": Balancing Liability,
Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1817 (2014).
63.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, §§ 2.3-4.
64.
See Karnow, supra note 43, at 52.
65.
See Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1865.
66.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, §§ 9.5-6.
67.
See id.; cf. § 10.5 (ordinary standard of care); id. § 10.17 (common carrier); id. § 11.1
(negligence per se).
68.
See id. § 9.6.
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a. Negligent Design
With negligent design, a product designer is liable for the costs
of an injury related to her product if the victim establishes that the
injury was proximately caused by the designer's specific unreasonable
acts or omissions in the process of designing the product. 69 Whether the
designer acted unreasonably is substantially informed by industry
standard practices. 7 0
In the Al context, breach of duty and proximate cause will pose
an insurmountable hurdle for victims of AI injuries in a suit alleging
negligent design. In analyzing whether the designer satisfied her duty
of care, the court will examine the designer's practices when designing
the machine-learning algorithm, training the algorithm, and testing
and debugging the algorithm-all relative to industry norms and the
state of the art.71 The court will consider whether the designer
adequately predicted risks and implemented safeguards against those
risks. 72 Unpredictable Al injuries occur, however, despite a designer's
reasonable or even perfect performance of the product design process. 73
Because a court cannot expect a designer to predict the unpredictable,
it will not be possible to prove insufficient care. 74
Perhaps a creative plaintiffs attorney might one day argue that
a designer's duty requires the designer to develop a better intuition of
the kinds of injuries that might result from Al products or to utilize
state-of-the-art tools, like virtual simulators, to predict previously
unpredictable Al injuries. 75 While such an argument may persuade

See id. §§ 12.1, .6; CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 139. This Note does not consider
69.
the trivial cases where, thanks to a pattern of recurring accidents, res ipsa loquitur-the principle
that the fact finder may reasonably infer negligence from the circumstances-will apply. See
DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, § 13.3; Vladeck, supra note 55, at 142-44. This Note
focuses on the "rare, untraceable to any defect, and inexplicable" injuries where no inference of
negligence can be made. Vladeck, supra note 55, at 143-44.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, § 12.6.
70.
71.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supranote 34, at 140; Bryan H. Choi, Crashworthy Code 47-48
2018),
No.
465,
Paper
Law,
Working
State
Pub.
(Ohio
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3230829 [https://perma.cc/P9YR-MN8Q]. It
is a mathematically-proven fact that testing the code after it has been written, which is the
standard practice of the industry, will not assure correctness in the code. See Choi, supra, at 27.
Furthermore, judges' and juries' competence in evaluating scientific evidence, like the expert
testimonies of computer engineers, is highly suspect. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK

ON EVIDENCE § 203 (7th ed. 2014).
72.
See Smith, supra note 60, at 207.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 140; Karnow, supra note 43, at 74 ("All the
73.
knowledge in the universe about all the agents and subsystems is not enough to fix the future
behavior of these systems.").
See Karnow, supra note 43, at 74.
74.
See id. at 76.
75.
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some courts, as a technical matter, predicting and preventing Al
behavior may never become feasible. 76
For the same reason, victims of AI injuries will not be able to
establish proximate cause. Proximate cause is satisfied if the factfinder
determines that the particular injury was within the scope of the risk
created by the designer's negligence.7 7 In the case of Al design, the
designer's liability extends only to reasonably foreseeable consequences
of negligently designing AI products.7 8 It is unlikely that an injury
resulting from a complex interaction of unpredictable Al algorithms and
unforeseeable environmental factors is within the scope of the
designer's liability. 79 In the language of tort law, the environment and
the machine learning process itself are superseding causes that break
the chain of causation between the designer's conduct and the injury.8 0
b. Negligent Use
A product's user is liable for a product-related injury if the user's
failure to exercise reasonable care in the use of the product proximately
caused the injury.8 1 Negligent use or misuse is typically alleged by the
designer as a shield to avoid liability,82 but a victim could also use it as
a sword against a third party. 83
In the context of Al injuries, misuse may include feeding the Al
poor or insufficient training data, providing careless instructions to the
machine, or inadequately supervising the machine. 84 For example, in
an early automation case, a court refused to find the manufacturer of a
plane's autopilot feature responsible for a crash, reasoning that the

76.

See id. at 74; supra note 55 and accompanying text.

77.

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§

15.10. For example, a negligent

vacuum designer is only liable for injuries that are a foreseeable consequence of negligent vacuum
design; she is not liable for an injury sustained as a consequence of the victim's car accident, even
if it occurred because she was on the way to repairing a negligently designed vacuum. See id.
§ 15.1.
78.
See id.
79.

See Karnow, supra note 43, at 73 ("With autonomous robots which are complex

machines, ever more complex as they interact seamless[1y, porously, with the larger environment,
linear causation gives way to complex, nonlinear interactions."). A designer would certainly be
liable for the injuries caused by a trivial autonomous robot with only a few inputs and only a few
degrees of freedom, but that is not the focus of this Note. See id. at 74.
80.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 122.
81.
82.

See id. at 138; DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, §§ 33.17-18.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, §§ 33.17-.18.

83.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 132. Claiming that another misused a product
is a typical negligence claim. Id.
84.
Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1861.
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pilot had caused the accident by failing to maintain a proper lookout.8 5
Similarly, it is likely that courts will continue to hold passengers of selfdriving vehicles liable for injuries resulting from carelessly engaging
self-driving mode, so long as self-driving vehicles expect passengers to
disengage the self-driving feature in dangerous conditions or conditions
against which the manual warns. 6
A user accused of misusing a product can counter that the
"misuse" was foreseeable, and therefore, the designer should have
provided reasonable safeguards against the misuse.8 7 For example, a
user could argue that his failure to maintain a lookout over a selfdriving vehicle was a foreseeable kind of misuse and therefore the
vehicle's designer should have designed a safety feature to prevent it.88
However, designers are not required to implement safeguards for every
foreseeable misuse of their products, in particular, those misuses that
present obvious risks to the user.8 9 As Al technology proliferates, Al
users will increasingly be on notice of the dangerous consequences of
improperly training or supervising AI.9 0
Over time, however, it is likely that negligent use, like negligent
design, will also become a futile claim, since Al performance will quickly
exceed human performance and humans will reasonably, if not
necessarily, come to rely on increasingly flawless and paternalistic AI. 9 1
In fact, experts anticipate that some Al products will ultimately lack
human controls entirely. For example, advanced self-driving vehicles
will not come with steering wheels or pedals. 92 As such, neither
negligent design nor negligent use will be to blame for Al injuries.

See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming CollisionBetween Autonomous
85.
Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2012) (discussing Brouse
v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ohio 1949)).
See id. at 1326-27.
86.
87.

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§

33.18.

See Gurney, supra note 15, at 268.
88.
See id. at 269-70; DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, §§ 33.10, .17 (explaining
89.
that assuming the risk of using a product in an obviously dangerous way is essentially the same
legal claim as negligence).
See Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1861-62.
90.
91.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 125; Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation,
Relinquishment, and Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, ROBOT L. 102, 117 (2016); Bill
12:00 PM),
2000,
(Apr. 1,
Us, WIRED
the Future Doesn't Need
Why
Joy,
https://www.wired.com/2000/04/joy-2/ [https://perma.cc/7T6R-TRZP].
See Alex Davies, GM Will Launch Robocars Without Steering Wheels Next Year, WIRED
92.
(Jan. 12, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/gm-cruise-self-driving-car-launch-2019/
[https://perma.cc/4UMM-N94Z].
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2. Strict Liability for Design Defects
A product designer may also bear the cost of a product-related
injury if the product's design was unreasonably dangerous (i.e.,
defective), and the design defect proximately caused the injury. 93 A
design is defective, according to the risk-utility test, only if the potential
harms of the design (i.e., the risks) outweigh its potential benefits (i.e.,
the utility). 94 A design's utility is comprised of the benefits to the user,
including reduced price, and to society in general. 95 In lieu of a full riskutility analysis, some courts merely ask whether there existed a
reasonable alternative design (i.e., another design that could have
reduced the danger, which would not have unduly burdened the
product's utility). 9 6 In theory, once the victim establishes that a
product's design was at fault for her injury (i.e., that the design was
defective and the defect caused the injury), the product's designer is
strictly liable even if she exercised perfect care.9 7
In the context of Al injuries, 98 early victims may prevail against
Al designers. 99 However, fewer accidents will be attributable to faulty
design as the technology matures. This is because producing a
reasonable alternative design is particularly difficult for Al and
machine learning algorithms.1 00 As a practical matter, intelligent
machines keep little documentation of their reasons for making certain
decisions, namely, the rules that they have learned and how the rules
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, § 33.4 (elements of products liability);
(risk utility test); id. § 33.11 (reasonable alternative design).
94.
See id. § 33.9; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MISS. L.J. 825, 836-37 (1973). A minority of jurisdictions apply solely the consumer expectations
test, but the consumer expectations test is criticized as both over- and under-inclusive, and the
Products Restatement rejects the test in favor of balancing risk-utility. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
93.

id.

§ 33.9

OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

note 5,
95.

§§

§ 2 cmt.

a (AM. LAW INST. 2018); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra

33.6, .8.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§ 33.9;

Wade, supra note 94, at 837-38

(listing seven factors to consider in a full risk-utility analysis).
96.
See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, § 33.11.
97.
See id. §§ 33.2, .9.; Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability,
2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 38 (2017) [hereinafter Smith, Automated Driving];Bryant Walker Smith,
Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L. REV. 1777, 1800 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, ProximityDriven Liability].
98.
Although this Note treats injuries due to intelligent machines and software in the
same way, software may not be considered a "product" subject to products liability law in the first
place because it is not a tangible manufactured product; in which case, the victim can only rely on
negligence law. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 136.

99.
See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 85, at 1333-34. Marchant and Lindor argue that,
initially, Al designers are likely to lose because juries are unable to put aside their hindsight bias
and because juries will not sympathize with the argument that the intangible social utility of an
algorithm outweighs the risk of a concrete injury. See id. at 1334.
100.
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 125-26; CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at
136; Gurney, supra note 15, at 263-64; Smith, Automated Driving, supra note 97, at 38.
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Even if they kept more
were applied to the instant facts.10 1
documentation, Al's rules are too complex for a human, even an Al
expert, to analyze or to adjudge their reasonableness. 102 Victims will
struggle to persuade a court that an alternative learning algorithm or
training process would have led to AI that could have avoided the risk
at a reasonable cost to consumers. 103 A victim may instead argue that
the designer could have hardcoded the machine to avoid the injury for
essentially no extra cost; 104 but (1) the injury likely occurred because no
one could foresee it in the first place, so it would not have been possible
for the designer to hardcode a safeguard and (2) the main benefit of
using a machine learning algorithm is that designers are freed from
manually coding the Al's rules.1 0 5 In fact, many Al could not exist if
designers were required to code rules for each scenario. 106 Courts will
hesitate to repudiate machine learning algorithms and all their social
benefits under the design defect theory. 107
3. Other Bases for Strict Liability
Dissatisfied with existing doctrines, some commentators have
proposed subjecting Al designers to strict liability for the injuries their
Al cause regardless of defect by analogizing the injuries to other types
of injuries that give rise to liability without fault.10 8 For example, Al
injuries have been compared to injuries caused by employees, children,
abnormally dangerous animals, and abnormally dangerous activities,

101.
See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RETHINKING INSURANCE AND LIABILITY IN THE
TRANSFORMATIVE AGE OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 13 (2018).

See Smith, Automated Driving, supra note 97, at 51-52; Smith, supra note 60, at 207.
102.
103.
See, e.g., Steven Walczak & Narciso Cerpa, Heuristic Principles for the Design of
Artificial Neural Networks, 41 INFO. & SOFTWARE TECH. 107, 107 (1999) (discussing improvements
to the design process of artificial neural networks, one type of Al algorithm). Al designers have
many choices when designing an intelligent machine that affect the choices the machine ultimately
makes and the speed at which the machine reaches its decisions. However, there exist only basic
heuristics to help make those choices, and designers currently rely on experts' past experience and
intuition. See id. at 107, 115.
104.
See Smith, Automated Driving, supra note 97, at 47. To hardcode a rule simply means
to encode the rule in the AI's algorithm directly, as opposed to having the Al learn it through
training. See id.; see also James Vincent, Inside Amazon's $3.5 Million Competition to Make Alexa
Chat
Like
a
Human,
VERGE
(June
13,
2018,
9:17
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/13/17453994/amazon-alexa-prize-2018-competitionconversational-ai-chatbots [https://perma.cc/M5U6-J4VQ] (discussing hardcoding).
105.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 138-39; supra Section I.B.
106.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 138-39.
See Funkhouser, supra note 58, at 457-58.
107.
Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1866-67; see also, e.g., CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at
108.
120, 131.
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all of which give rise to vicarious or strict liability. 109 The random
occurrence of Al injuries is also comparable to the random occurrence
of manufacturing defects despite a product manufacturer's best efforts
at quality assurance. 110 Although these legal doctrines do not fit Al
injuries perfectly, proponents argue that the underlying principles of
strict liability regimes are the same, namely, that designers are best
suited to and therefore ought to internalize the cost of Al injuries to
third parties.' Designers can pass the cost onto consumers by hiking
prices, or bear those costs themselves and have insurers spread the
risk. 112 Furthermore, designers might embrace greater responsibility
because (1) the positive impact on product demand due to Al's safety
will outweigh the negative impact due to higher prices, so designers can
still anticipate a healthy profit anyway 1 3 and (2) designers prefer the
certain liability of strict liability regimes over the uncertain risk of
other liability regimes.1 14
However, strict liability regimes allocate an undue proportion of
costs to Al designers and users and are therefore socially undesirable.
Under a strict liability regime, Al designers or their users are forced to
bear the cost of Al's negative externalities without compensation for the
value of their substantial positive externalities.1 1 5 Put differently, strict
liability shifts the costs of Al injuries from victims to Al designers and
users, but does not shift the value of social benefits that third parties
receive back to the designers and users. As such, the market will overly
disincentivize Al production and the market's demand for Al will be
unsatisfied.1 16 The underproduction of Al is not merely an economist's
academic concern; each day that Al products are delayed is an extra day
that conventional products continue to expel carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere, injure or kill people in accidents, and perpetuate social
inequities. Therefore, some commentators have argued for a subsidy
rather than a tax on Al to accelerate its development.1 1 7

109.
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1863-65; see also CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note
34, at 128, 130.

§

110.

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See
See
See
See
See

116.

See OPENSTAX COLLEGE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 280 (2014); supra Section I.A. In

33.5.

Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1862-65; Viadeck, supra note 55, at 146.
Gurney, supra note 15, at 272-73.
Smith, Automated Driving, supra note 97, at 44-45, 53-54.
Smith, Proximity-DrivenLiability, supranote 97, at 1813.
Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1862-63.

the absence of a public subsidy, a product or service that produces a positive externality is
underproduced because consumers tend rationally to become "free riders," people who hope that
others will pay for the product so they get to enjoy the benefits for free. See OPENSTAX COLLEGE,
supra, at 280.
117.
See Hubbard, supra note 62, at 1870; JAMESANDERSON ETAL., U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, at xiii-xiv n. 1 (2010).
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4. General Problems with the Tort Regime
In addition to its difficulty allocating Al injury costs, the tort
regime suffers from other weaknesses that apply generally to all
injuries. This Section briefly discusses a few of the most prominent
weaknesses: high costs, inadequate compensation due to lump-sum
damage awards, and minimal deterrent effect.
High private and public costs. Parties to an injury undergo a
multi-year litigation process and expend sizable legal fees. 118 While the
suit drags on, the victim also foregoes valuable opportunities as a result
of her injury. 119 These costs are incurred not only by the parties, but
also by the public in the form of judicial administration costs and lost
social productivity.1 2 0

Lump-sum damages. Courts award damages as a lump sum, as
opposed to ongoing benefits, which results in (1) inaccurate speculation
of the future cost of injuries and (2) systematic undervaluation of injury
costs because of a tendency to underestimate the impact of inflation.1 2 1
Minimal deterrence. While it is often argued that tort law
prevents injuries by penalizing fault, product designers are often
undeterred by the penalty. In theory, this is because the amount of
liability is a function of the victim's injury, not a function of the
tortfeasor's fault (with the exception of punitive damages for outrageous
conduct).1 2 2 As such, damage awards can be small, both objectively and
relative to the product designer's total costs.1 2 3 Liability insurance also
spreads the cost of damages, cushioning the financial pain and
consequently the deterrent effect. 124 Consistent with the theory, the
empirical evidence of tort law's actual deterrent effect is inconclusive at

118.
See GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 21 (1979).

119.
See id. at 24.
120.
See id. In theory, much of the time and expense to litigants are avoided by settlement
if the facts and law are clear. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77-79 (1997). Now, most car
accidents are settled outside of the courtroom. However, settlements still fail because the law is
not clear, the case is highly fact-specific, information asymmetry exists between the parties, and
not all victims behave rationally. See id. at 79-81.
121.
See PALMER, supra note 118, at 24.
122.
See id.
123.
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 570-71
(1985).
124.
See id.; Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 977-78 (1985).
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best. 125 Tort law is indeed an inefficient cost allocation regime, nothing
more. 126

B. PublicRegulatory Law
Regulatory law also plays an important role in allocating injury
costs, as well as in preventing injuries. Regulatory regimes are created
by federal or state legislatures, which first set broad policy goals, and
then delegate authority to administrative agencies to implement
detailed plans that achieve those goals. 127 Agencies conduct research,
promulgate standards, and investigate and adjudicate violations. 128
Their strength lies in their ability to gather experts and to analyze
problems with a different perspective, motivation, and timescale from
the private sector, 129 provided they are not captured by the industry
they regulate. 130 Their weakness, however, is the high decision cost of
administrative actions such as the notice-and-comment process for
making new regulations. 13 1
Various kinds of regulatory regimes have been proposed to
address Al injuries.
Most involve implementing or amending
specialized regimes, such as the automobile safety regime. 132 Some
have proposed creating a general regime tasked with overseeing all Alrelated matters. 133 Both methods have their respective strengths, and
some form of regulatory regime will likely be necessary, but it will be
increasingly difficult for the regulatory process to adequately respond
to AI's complexity and electric pace of progress. 134

125.
See Sugarman, supra note 123, at 587-90 (discussing the empirical research
conducted by proponents of the tort-as-deterrent theory and concluding that all either suffer from
methodological problems or fail to consider alternative explanations for their data).
126.
See id.
127.
See Scherer, supra note 34, at 381.
128.
See id. at 382.
129.
See id. at 383.
130.

See JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 212 (1st ed.

2019).
131.

See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 2.2

(2d ed.

2014).
132.
See, e.g., Summary: SELF Drive Act, H.R. 3388-115th Congress (2017-2018),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3388 [https://perma.cc/
6PKV-ADV7] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) ("The Department of Transportation (DOT) must require
safety assessment certifications for the development of a highly automated vehicle or an
automated driving system.").
133.
See TURNER, supra note 130, at 213; Scherer, supra note 34, at 393.
134.
See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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1. Specialized Regimes
Policy makers at the state and federal levels may regulate Al on
an industry-by-industry basis. While specialized agencies may achieve
some success at the outset, the necessarily slow and participatory
nature of the rulemaking process will make it difficult for these
agencies to address complex and rapidly evolving AI applications. 135
Consider, for example, the motor vehicle industry. The motor
vehicle regulatory regime consists of state law, which regulates vehicle
operation (e.g., driver licensing and traffic rules) and ownership (e.g.,
titling and registration), and federal law, which regulates vehicle
design and manufacture. 136 As of early 2019, over forty states have
considered legislation concerning self-driving vehicles, and twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have already enacted it.137 Efforts
are underway to draft a model statute. 138 At the federal level, the
Department of Transportation published its third self-driving vehicle
regulatory policy in October 2018,139 and both houses of Congress have
introduced bills to amend the federal motor vehicle safety laws to
address AI. 140 Collectively, the motor vehicle regulatory regime must,
at the very least, address the following issues 1 41:
(1) How should self-driving vehicles be defined under these
regulations? Self-driving vehicles are likely to differ greatly in their
form and capabilities. The Society of Automotive Engineers currently
defines degrees of vehicle automation on a five-level scale. 142 Agencies

135.
See supra Sections IA, I.C.
136.
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 138. The National Highway and
Transportation Safety Administration, a subsidiary of the Department of Transportation,
promulgates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; tests, certifies, and publishes reports on
equipment; and orders recalls for unsafe equipment. Id. at xxii.
See Autonomous Vehicles I Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST.
137.
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles[https://perma.ccW797-QLN8] [hereinafter Selfself-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx
Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation].
138.

See generally HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Proposed

Official Draft Oct. 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocument
File.ashx?DocumentFileKey=48de7407-2cd5-2ae 1-ccl2-d9131132fd67&forceDialog-0
[https://perma.cc/NH5N-CAUG].
139.

See U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSP., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION:

AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3.0 (2018), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policyinitiatives/automated-vehicles/3207 11/preparing-future-transportation- automated-vehicle-30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZ87-X3VQ].
140.
See American Vision for Safer Transportation Through Advancement of Revolutionary
Technologies Act (AV START Act), S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017); SELF Drive Act, H.R. 3388, 115th
Cong. (2017).
Cybersecurity and data privacy are also important issues raised by self-driving vehicle
141.
sensors and algorithms. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 70.
142.
See id. at 2-3.
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could adopt this scale or create their own, and promulgate separate
rules for each level of autonomy.14 3 Autonomous capabilities will,
however, evolve over time, so regulators will have to update definitions
continuously. 14 4
(2) Should passengers be required to have driver's licenses? As
discussed above, vehicles could drive with disabled or underage
passengers, or no passengers at all. 1 4 5 Agencies must decide what skills
passengers should be required to have. 146 On one hand, agencies could
consider a tiered licensing system with fewer requirements for more
autonomous vehicles. 147 On the other hand, agencies could require
passengers to acquire new skills to properly supervise vehicles, in the
way airplane pilots must be proficient in the capabilities and
limitations of autopilot features.
(3) Should self-driving vehicles be required to follow
conventional traffic rules? Some states have already adopted different
rules for certain kinds of self-driving vehicles. 148 For example, in these
states, autonomous truck platoons may drive with shorter trailing
distances than human drivers. 149 Regulators must also consider
whether to loosen requirements like speed limits, traffic signals, or
signaling requirements. 15 0 At the same time, risks that arise from new
capabilities will likely require new rules.
(4) How should agencies define and test vehicle safety
standards? Current federal standards require traditional vehicle
designs to satisfy technologically neutral standards (e.g., fuel economy
tests, emissions tests, and crash safety tests) and to implement
specified safety technologies, such as airbags and seat belts. 15 1
143.
See id. at 72.
144.
See, e.g., Marcy Klevorn, Taking Back the Streets: Using Systems Thinking to Return
Our
City
Streets
to
the
Community,
MEDIUM
(Jan.
8,
2018),
https://medium.com/cityoftomorrow/taking-back-the-streets-using-systems-thinking-to-return-

our-city-streets-to-the-community-dc404cbee50f [https://perma.cc/WZ4L-Y3KPI (discussing Ford
Motor Company's proposal to incorporate in vehicles and in city infrastructure a protocol to allow
vehicles to communicate with each other and optimize the transportation ecosystem as a whole);
Hyperdrive: China's Built a Road So Smart It Will Be Able to Charge Your Car, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
11, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.cominews/features/2018-04-11/the-solar-highwaythat-can-recharge-electric-cars-on-the-move [https://perma.cclP23W-2MSR] (discussing China's
construction of a highway that wirelessly charges electric cars, for when cars that have the
capability to be wirelessly charged hit the roads).
145.
See supra Section I.A.
146.

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 72.

147.
148.
149.

See id. at 72-73.
See Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, supra note 137.
See id.

150.

See LAUREN ISAAC, DRIVING TOWARDS DRIVERLESS: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES 27 (2016) (recommending raising speed limits and reducing lane widths, among other
reforms).

151.

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 101.
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Likewise, agencies could subject self-driving vehicle designs to
technologically neutral performance tests and specific coding
With respect to performance tests, self-driving
requirements. 15 2
vehicles will have to be tested in more conditions-wet, bumpy,
unpaved, dark, foggy-than conventional vehicles, because the vehicle
and the manufacturer will not be able to rely on a human to make
adjustments to the various driving conditions. 153 Selecting specific
coding requirements will be a highly technical task, requiring agencies
to develop a whole new kind of expertise. And what would coding
requirements look like? For example, would they require vehicles to
know specific driving rules, to pass an intelligence test, or to have a
specific neural network architecture?
This brief discussion of issues concerning the regulation of selfdriving vehicles begins to reveal the Sisyphean nature of drafting
regulations for AI.1 5 4 Not only must agencies answer highly technical
issues at the outset, but new, increasingly complex issues will arise with
increasing frequency as the technology naturally evolves. Contrast that
to the tremendous procedural and substantive burdens that
administrative law justifiably imposes on agencies to ensure rational,
Even with thoughtful
fair, and democratic regulatory actions.
rulemaking, agencies can easily cause catastrophic consequences on the
complex systems they regulate with seemingly simple rules.1 55 In
certain industries, there are already signs that regulating Al may be an
insurmountable challenge. For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a highly sophisticated agency with a narrowly tailored
agenda, has essentially given up on regulating flash crashes.15 6
2. General Al Regime
Some commentators, such as Matthew U. Scherer and Jacob
Turner, propose regulating Al across all industries under a single,
general regime instead. 15 7 For example, Scherer proposes creating an
administrative agency with the purpose "to ensure that Al is safe,

See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 139, at iv. Under the Trump administration,
152.
the Department of Transportation has strongly supported a market-driven, technology neutral
approach. See id.
See ANDERSON ET AL., supranote 13, at 107-08.
153.
See id. at 103-04 (referencing a government transportation official's view that issuing
154.
"relevant" motor vehicle standards is extremely difficult).
See J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society
155.
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE
L.J. 849, 881, 883-84 (1996).
See Woodward, supra note 53, at 25.
156.
See TURNER, supra note 130, at 213-14; Scherer, supra note 34, at 393.
157.

2019]

UNIVERSAL NO-FAULT SOCIAL INSURANCE

1177

secure, susceptible to human control, and aligned with human
interests." 15 8 To that end, the proposed agency would define the Al that
fall under its jurisdiction and update that definition regularly through
notice and comment. 159 Al under the agency's jurisdiction will be
reviewed, tested, and certified by expert staff with a mix of academic or
industry experience attuned to prevailing trends in the study of AI. 1 60
Regulating Al under a single regime is attractive for several
reasons. First, it would allow experts in different fields of Al to share
overlapping resources and insights. Second, a single agency can avoid
redundant regulation, a risk of having separate, specialized regimes. 16 1
Third, a single agency can spot and address harms that arise from AI
activity at the boundary between industries or from a combination of
activities by Al from multiple industries. 162
That said, a single regime has many weaknesses. First, a
broadly defined Al agency would overlap with existing agencies. 163 For
example, how would this regime interact with motor vehicle regulators?
Second, an Al agency's scope may have no principled limit as AI
eventually touches all aspects of human life. Third, the same weakness
of specialized agencies-the slow, participatory nature of rulemakingwill afflict this regime, potentially with greater potency, since it must
coordinate more people and respond to bigger, more complex problems.
As such, while some combination of a general Al agency and industryspecific agencies is probably necessary to research and deter
manageable harms, 164 traditional regulatory regimes will increasingly
struggle to prevent complex, rapidly evolving Al harms.

158.
See Scherer, supranote 34, at 394.
See id. at 360-61.
159.
160.
See id. at 394-96.
161.
See id.
162.
See id. at 394-97.
163.
See id. at 394-95.
164.
See TURNER, supra note 130, at 220. Some potentially important bills have already
been introduced in Congress to begin to address AI as a distinct problem separate from existing
agencies. See Huu Ngyuen, Artificial Intelligence Law Is Here, Part Three, ABOVE LAw (Oct. 4,
2018,
11:00
AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/legal-innovation-center/2018/10/04/artificialintelligence-law-is-here-part-three/ [https://perma.cc/28RJ-RPGS]. The following are some bills
Congress is considering: The National Security Commission Artificial Intelligence Act of 2018
(H.R. 5336); the Artificial Intelligence Job Opportunity and Background Summary Act of 2018
(H.R. 4829); the Fundamentally Understanding the Usability and Realistic Evolution of Artificial
Intelligence Act of 2017 (H.R. 4625); Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act of 2018 (S.3127). See
id. For a discussion on regulatory trends overseas, see TURNER, supra note 130, at 225-36.
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III. SOLUTION: UNIVERSAL No-FAULT SOCIAL INSURANCE

No-fault insurance schemes are not a new concept, 165 but the
proliferation of Al is resurrecting their appeal in the twenty-first
century.1 66 For example, one commentator has proposed a no-fault
scheme inspired by the National Vaccination Injury Compensation
Program (NVICP), noting the similarities between the risks and
benefits posed by vaccinations and Al.1 6 7 Under this commentator's
scheme, certain AI, like self-driving vehicles, could be taxed to maintain
a communal fund to compensate victims of injuries related to those
Al.1 68 This Note, however, focuses on the even more progressive scheme
that New Zealand has adopted, which eliminates the tort regime, covers
all personal injuries by accident, and is partly financed by general tax
revenues.1 69 A scheme based on the New Zealand model will distribute
the costs of both Al and non-Al injuries fairly, ensure public confidence
in the development of Al, and encourage Al's continuing growth in the
United States.
A. The New Zealand Scheme
In 1972, New Zealand, which follows the same English common
law tradition as the United States, enacted the Accident Compensation
Act, creating a social insurance scheme administered by the Accident
There are three essential
Compensation Corporation (ACC).1 70
components to the scheme: (1) it covers all personal injuries resulting
from accidents without regard to fault;1 71 (2) it abolishes the right to
bring tort claims for covered injuries;1 72 and (3) it is financed by
appropriations from general tax revenues and by taxes on select

See, e.g., JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S.
165.
EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 2 (2010) (historical and existing no-fault

automobile insurance schemes in the United States); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,
§ 36.2 (the workers' compensation system); id. § 36.6 (the Social Security disability system); id.
§ 36.9 (government compensation funds like the national childhood vaccine injury program).
166.

See, e.g., ANDERSON, HEATON & CARROLL, supra note 165, at 142-43; Funkhouser,

supra note 58, at 461.
See Funkhouser, supra note 58, at 461.
167.
See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
168.
(showing the model legislative structure of the proposed Al scheme).

§ 300aa-1

to aa-34 (2018)

See generally GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW
169.
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979) (explaining the legislative history

and analyzing the policy issues of the New Zealand scheme).
See Accident Compensation Act (No. 43/1972) (N.Z.).
170.
171.
See PALMER, supra note 169, at 263.
See id. at 271.
172.
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activities. 173 This scheme has now been in place for nearly five decades
and continues to enjoy great public support. 174
1. Coverage and Benefits
New Zealand's insurance scheme covers all personal injuries by
accident.1 75 Personal injury by accident is, in general, an unexpected
physical injury due to a specific event, regardless of who-if anybodyis at fault. 176 An injury due to a car crash is a prime example.1 7 7 A
physical injury due to an intentional tort or criminal act-even an
assault-is also covered, because the injury is unexpected from the
victim's perspective and is due to a specific event.17 8
Upon receiving a covered claim, the ACC compensates victims
for covered injuries through four kinds of benefits: (1) ongoing
compensation for medical treatment and social and occupational
rehabilitation; (2) ongoing payment of 80 percent of the claimant's lost
earnings subject to a statutory cap; (3) lump-sum payment for injuries
that create a permanent disability; and (4) compensation to dependents
of a person killed by accident, which includes one-time payments like
funeral grants and periodic payments for loss of dependency. 179 The
ACC has a legal obligation to make decisions in a timely manner, and
claimants have a right to appeal administrative decisions to a court.18 0
Under the scheme, personal injuries as a result of Al-however
attenuated-are already covered.18 1 Such injuries include a substantial
range of injuries directly caused by Al, such as those caused by selfdriving vehicles, smart medical devices, surgical robots, factory robots,
173.
See id. at 365-66.
174.
See Stephen Todd, Forty Years of Accident Compensation in New Zealand, 28 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 189, 218 (2011) [hereinafter Todd, Forty Years]; Stephen Todd, Negligence
Liabilityfor PersonalInjury: A Perspectivefrom New Zealand, 25 U.N.S.W. L.J. 895, 895-96 (2002)
[hereinafter Todd, Negligence Liability].
175.
Todd, Forty Years, supranote 174, at 198.
176.
See id. at 198-200.
177.
See id. at 200.
178.
See Margaret A. McGregor Vennell, Accident Compensation, in THE LAW OF TORTS IN
NEW ZEALAND 26, 44 (1st ed. 1991). An intentionally self-inflicted injury-such as suicide-is not
covered because it is not unexpected to the injured. See Todd, Forty Years, supra note 174, at 200,
211-12. Select somewhat attenuated injuries are covered, like post-traumatic stress disorder
resulting from a specific, unexpected event and injuries or complications that arise from a medical
treatment or workplace condition, regardless of whether the treatment or condition was negligent.
See

What

We

Cover,

ACCIDENT

COMPENSATION

CORP.

(ACC)

(Dec.

12,

2018),

https://www.acc.co.nz/im-injuredlinjuries-we-cover/what-we-cover/ [https://perma.cc/
Q3W5-N5N7]. Ordinary, gradual illnesses, like appendicitis, are not covered, since they are not
linked to a cognizable event or cause. See id.
179.
See Todd, Forty Years, supra note 174, at 210-11.
180.
See id. at 212-13.
181.
See TURNER, supra note 130, at 103.
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and police and emergency response robots. 18 2 They even include
physical injuries that are indirectly caused by Al, like assaults incited
by viral hate speech on social media platforms.1 8 3 As AI takes over an
increasing proportion of tasks in the physical world, AI injuries will
make up an increasing proportion of total personal injuries.
2. Abolition of Tort Claims
In general, the New Zealand scheme bars access to courts for
claims covered by the scheme, so that claimants cannot recover
damages twice. 184 Claims seeking compensatory damages for personal
injuries are therefore barred, including those caused by AI.185 Claims
seeking compensation for property damage, which are not covered by
the scheme, survive.18 6
Claims seeking punitive damages for outrageous conduct also
survive.18 7 This is because, formally, a prayer for punitive damages
arises out of the defendant's punishable conduct, not the victim's
injury.1 8 8 Also, punitive damages serve a different function than
compensatory damages-namely, to punish and deter socially
undesirable behavior. As such, the scheme continues to allow private
This is similar to the workers'
claims for punitive damages.18 9
compensation scheme in the United States. Also like US courts, New
Zealand courts typically award punitive damages only for reckless or
intentional wrongdoing; negligence, however gross, will not suffice. 190
As such, the New Zealand scheme allows courts to impose punitive
damages against, for example, Al designers who intentionally fail to
rectify a dangerous condition of their products, but defective product
and negligence claims against Al designers are barred.
Besides private punitive damages claims, the ACC also
undertakes various mandatory and voluntary initiatives in order to

182.
183.

See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C. AI now make decisions that affect so many aspects of people's

lives (e.g., credit applications, criminal sentencing, job recruitment) that it would not be surprising
to find that Al somehow influences many violent acts. See generally O'NEIL, supra note 10.

184.
174, at 207.
185.
174, at 207.
186.
174, at 207.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§ 36.5;

Todd, Forty Years, supra note

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§ 36.5;

Todd, Forty Years, supra note

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5,

§ 36.5;

Todd, Forty Years, supra note

See
See
See
See

Todd, Forty Years, supra note 174, at 209.
id.
id.
id. at 209-10.
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prevent injuries. 191 For example, the ACC has a duty to report insights
on medical treatment risks it discovers from claims data to hospitals
and to the Ministry of Health. 192 The ACC also maintains a broad
portfolio of injury prevention programs. 193 In fiscal year 2017-18, these
investments amounted to 69.4 million New Zealand dollars, and the
ACC estimates that 1.72 dollars' worth of injuries were prevented for
every dollar spent.1 94 And New Zealand also enforces safety standards
for hazardous activities-including product design-under regulatory
legislation such as the Fair Trading Act, Consumer Guarantees Act,
Medicines Act, Food Act, and Land Transport Act.195 Early-stage
discussions regarding how to regulate Al are underway in New
Zealand.1 96 For now, however, New Zealanders are ironically concerned
with the government's and the ACC's use of Al to profile clients and
predict their behavior.1 9 7

191.
192.

See id. at 217-18.
See id. at 218.

193.
See ACC New Zealand, Injury Prevention at ACC, YOUTUBE (Sept. 9, 2018),
https://youtu.be/ORM4MPO3xbO. Programs promote safety in early childhood, teach adolescents
about safe sex and respectful relationships, encourage healthy and safe workplace practices,
promote safe driving, prevent sports-related injuries, and prevent falls and fractures in seniors.
See id.
194.
See ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2018: PARTNERING
WITH NEW ZEALAND 28 (2018).
195.
See SARAH ARMSTRONG ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY IN NEW ZEALAND:
OVERVIEW (2018).

196.
See Jamie Morton, Call for Govt Data-Mining Watchdog, OTAGO DAILY TIMES (Apr.
22, 2018), https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/call-govt-data-mining-watchdog [https://perma.cc/
DNA4-FZJF].
197.

See id.
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3. Financing
Funding the New Zealand scheme is, in theory, the New Zealand
public's collective resonsibility.198 In practice, the ACC maintains five
distinct accounts with separate cash sources and uses-the nonearners' account, work account, earners' account, motor vehicle account,
and treatment injury accountl 99:
account is funded by government
* The non-earners'
appropriations (i.e., general tax revenues), and it covers people
who are not working, such as children and retirees. 200
* The work account is funded by taxes on employers and
independent contractors; it covers injuries at work. 201
* The earners' account is funded by income tax; it covers
nonoccupational injuries suffered by employed individuals.2 02
* The motor vehicle account is funded by a vehicle and motorcycle
ownership tax and a gasoline tax; it covers vehicle-related
injuries. 203
* The treatment injury account is funded by allocations from the
earners' and non-earners' accounts; it covers injuries caused by
medical treatment. 204
The accounts are also supplemented by returns from the ACC's
investment portfolio. 205 In fiscal year 2017-18, the ACC reported total
claim costs of 6.969 billion New Zealand dollars, total tax revenue of
4.120 billion New Zealand dollars, total investment revenue of 3.515
billion New Zealand dollars, and a surplus of roughly 28 million New
Zealand dollars. 206

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, § 36.6 (discussing Social Security's
198.
source of funds); Our History, ACC (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.acc.co.nz/about-us/who-weare/our-history! [https://perma.cc/QE39-LHFS].
199.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
prevention

See ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION, supra note 194, at 3.

Id. at 3, 107.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 101.
Id. In addition to claim costs, 638 million New Zealand dollars were spent on injury
costs, investment expenditures, and operating costs. Id.
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B. Application to AI Injuries
This Note proposes implementing a similar no-fault social
insurance scheme in the United States to address the looming problem
of Al injuries.
This Section first discusses issues surrounding
implementation. It then analyzes the plan's strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats. In short, while there undeniably is a risk
that claim costs will be great and the scheme financially unmanageable,
this plan has an equal, if not greater, potential to solve the difficulty of
allocating Al injury costs fairly and thereby support the legitimate
growth of the Al industry.
1. Implementation
This Section discusses the proposed scheme's coverage and
benefits, its relationship with the tort regime, and its financing. It
assumes the scheme is enacted by Congress under its Tax and Spend
authority, 207 as opposed to by states so as to prevent free riders and a
race to the bottom.
Coverage. This Note proposes that, at first, the US scheme
provide the same coverage as the New Zealand scheme: all personal
injuries by accident. As previously discussed, the class of personal
injuries by accident already includes many Al injuries and, going
forward, Al will be responsible for an increasing proportion of all
personal injuries. 208 This Note eschews a more modest approach that
limits coverage to Al injuries for two reasons: (1) distinguishing Al
injuries from traditional injuries is impracticable and (2) traditional
injuries also suffer from the deficiencies of tort law and it makes little
sense to distinguish the two kinds of injuries. Eventually, policy
makers may consider extending coverage beyond personal injuries to
intangible injuries like purely economic losses, emotional and
psychological injuries, and breaches of privacy.
Tort Claims. The US scheme should abolish tort claims for
covered injuries in order to prevent double recovery, as does the New
Zealand scheme. 209 A plethora of statutes already exists to prohibit
negligent and non-negligent dangerous activities and faulty products
and protect the public from harm, such as the Consumer Product Safety
Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 210 Regulations and injury
prevention initiatives specifically addressing Al should augment these
207.
208.
209.
210.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
See supra Section II.A. 1.
See Todd, Forty Years, supra note 174, at 207.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2089 (2018); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i (2018).
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programs, but this Note will not stake a position on whether they should
be administered by existing agencies or a new, all-encompassing Al
agency. 211 Since administrative actions may not be able to adequately
prevent Al injuries, lawyers should seriously consider fundamental
legal reforms such as robot personhood and robot liability as a new
means of injury deterrence, sooner rather than later. 2 12
Financing. This Note recommends that the US scheme be
financed from general tax revenues rather than from categorized
revenue streams as seen in the New Zealand scheme or the narrowly
focused NVICP scheme. Separating revenue streams-by, for example,
financing medical Al injuries with a tax on medical Al and financing
self-driving vehicle injuries with a tax on self-driving vehicles-is not
ideal because it would not spread the cost of Al across the entire
community, which will likely enjoy the benefits of each Al
collectively. 213 Consider again the example of self-driving vehicles.
Shifting the injury costs of motor vehicles with what is functionally a
strict liability regime to owners or to designers, who would in turn shift
the costs to their customers, might make sense today, since the owners
currently enjoy the entire benefits of conventional vehicles by
themselves. However, it makes less sense in the future, when owners
of self-driving vehicles provide substantial benefits to society with their
personal enjoyment-namely,
improvements to public safety,
to
access
and
productivity,
social
quality,
environmental
transportation. The system should arguably support, not burden, selfdriving vehicle ownership, as discussed earlier.2 14

See supra Section II.B.
211.
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at 145. While shocking at first blush, robot
212.
personhood is not problematic or unusual as a legal matter; robots can be accorded personhood
just as easily as a corporation is accorded personhood. See id. at 153; Vladeck, supra note 55, at
150. Granting robots personhood, and thereby granting them property rights, would allow
regulators and courts to punish and deter the behavior of intelligent machines directly, assuming
that machines are programmed to "fear" loss of property. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 34, at
149, 166, 168; TURNER, supranote 130, at 188-89; Solum, supra note 34, at 1271. But see Janosch
Delcker, Europe Divided Over Robot 'Personhood', POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2018, 8:29 AM),
https://www.politico.eularticle/europe-divided-over-robot-ai-artificial-intelligence-personhood/
[https://perma.cc/B8NT-893P].
See Sugarman, supra note 123, at 638-39. But see, e.g., Kyle Colonna, Autonomous
213.
Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 81, 125 (2012) (proposing an
insurance scheme for self-driving vehicle injuries financed by the car industry and modeled after
the nuclear regime); Funkhouser, supra note 58, at 461.
214.
See supra Section II.A.3.
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2. Analysis
This Section analyzes the proposed scheme's strengths and
weaknesses (internal factors), and opportunities and threats (external
factors).
Strengths. No-fault insurance schemes remove many of the
barriers that currently prevent victims, of both AI and non-Al injuries,
from seeking a remedy for their injuries: the burden of collecting
evidence, the burden of understanding and analyzing product designs,
the burden of proof, and cost. 2 15
Simultaneously, the collective
financing scheme empowers AI designers: it alleviates the chilling effect
that unpredictable fault-based liability instills.
Weaknesses. As previously discussed, fault-based liability has
minimal success at deterring undesirable behavior. 2 16 However, the
civil tort regime arguably serves as a legitimate outlet for victims to
satisfy their need for retributive and social justice. 217 Victims are
potentially better able to express themselves, gain publicity, effectuate
social change, and find comfort in private litigation rather than in
administrative proceedings. 2 18 As such, eliminating the tort regime for
personal injuries sacrifices an arguably important public interest.
Opportunities. Increased adoption of Al has the potential to
vastly reduce personal injury rates: according to optimists like Ray
Kurzweil, by the end of the twenty-first century, Al will not only reduce
injuries, it will reverse global warming and even cure death. 2 19 Even if
such utopian predictions are put aside, it is still reasonably likely that
injury rates and costs per injury will substantially decline thanks to a
few key injury-reducing Al technologies like self-driving vehicles and
health care Al, making the scheme significantly easier to finance. 220
Threats. Some futurists, on the other hand, have predicted Al
will not only increase injuries, but pose an existential threat to
humanity, similarly to nuclear and genetic technologies. 22 1 Again, even
with a tempered outlook, the proliferation of Al realistically could
215.
216.
217.
739 (1993).
218.
219.
220.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.4.
See Shigeaki Tanaka, Justice, Accidents and Compensation, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 736,
See id. But see Sugarman, supra note 123, at 611.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 26, at 244, 323, 325.
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 13; Tanya M. Anandan, Robots and Al in the

OR, RoBoTIC INDUS. ASS'N (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.robotics.org/content-detail.cfm/IndustrialRobotics-Industry-Insights/Robots-and-Al-in-the-OR/contentjid/7585
[https://perma.cc/5CWYHWFE].
221.
See Samuel Gibbs, Elon Musk: Regulate AI to Combat 'ExistentialThreat' Before It's
Too Late, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/17/elonmusk-regulation-ai-combat-existential-threat-tesla-spacex-ceo [https://perma.cc/83DA-PRQ5].
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increase injury rates and make an insurance scheme unsustainable.
Moreover, even before including the impact of Al on injury rates, there
is a risk that the insurance scheme would not translate from New
Zealand to the United States as an actuarial matter. Slight differences
in claim rates between Americans and New Zealanders due to cultural,
political, or even climatic differences would change the economics of the
scheme. Piloting the scheme on a small scale, such as at a state or
municipal level, might allow administrators to collect data, experiment
with the financial and administrative structure, and reduce these risks.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the coming decades, Al will provide vast improvements in
comfort, convenience, safety, security, and even social justice. But at
the same time, Al will inevitably cause a variety of injuries, the costs of
which will land disproportionately on blameless victims. Preventing
these injuries or shifting the liability with regulation will be
challenging. As a result, it would not be surprising if public opinion
quickly swings to suspicion, even fear, of Al. In response, this Note
proposes a social insurance scheme that covers all personal injuries
regardless of fault and whether Al was involved. The proposed solution
properly balances the public's interest in receiving Al's benefits as soon
as possible with victims' interest in just compensation. Going forward,
lawmakers will also need to consider appropriate responses to
intangible injuries, such as economic injuries, emotional and
psychological injuries, improper discrimination, and breaches of
privacy. A complete and effective social welfare system will maintain
public confidence in the development of Al and support the continuing
growth of Al industries.
Finally, growing domestic Al industries is increasingly crucial to
the United States' national interest.2 22 In addition to the positive
applications discussed above, Al has suspect applications in the
military, election tampering, public surveillance, and social
engineering. 223 If an illiberal state, such as China or Russia, gains a

See Elsa Kania, The Policy Dimension ofLeading in Al, LAWFARE (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:30
222.
[https://perma.cc/YK3B-XDYM];
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/policy-dimension-leading-ai
Jayshree Pandya, The Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 2:06 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/01/28/the-geopolitics-of-artificial-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/33JM-KSWF].
See Elaine Kamarck, Malevolent Soft Power, A, and the Threat to Democracy,
223.
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/malevolent-soft-power-aiNicholas Thompson & Ian
[https://perma.cclMWE3-7XAC];
and-the-threat-to-democracy/
Bremmer, The Al Cold War That Threatens Us All, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM),
[https://perma.cc/JQK8-A7H5].
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lead in or dominates Al technology, the United States' national security,
and arguably the entire international order, could be threatened. 224 If,
however, Al grows here, the United States can continue to lead the
international community towards a cleaner, wealthier, and freer
world. 225

Jin Yoshikawa*

224.
See Kamarck, supra note 223; David Meyer, Vladimir Putin Says Whoever Leads in
Artificial
Intelligence
Will
Rule
the
World,
FORTUNE
(Sept.
4,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/09/04/ai-artificial-intelligence-putin-rule-world/
[https://perma.cc/76MCR46T]; Thompson & Bremmer, supra note 223.
225.
See Kamarck, supra note 223; Kania, supra note 222.
J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2020; B.S., Columbia University
in the City of New York, Fu Foundation, School of Engineering and Applied Science, 2009. The
Author thanks his family-Yurina and Ray Yoshikawa-for their love and support. The Author
also thanks Professor Daniel Gervais for providing tremendous inspiration and research support
and Professor Edward Cheng for editorial guidance. The Author is grateful to all of the staff of
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, in particular Natalie Pike. Finally, the
Author is massively indebted to the endless patience of Noriko and Makoto Yoshikawa.

